|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]何晓梅,李梦.考虑制造商竞争的闭环供应链回收模式的决策研究[J].南京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,(3):121-127.
 HE Xiaomei,LI Meng.Decision Research of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Double Competition of Manufacturers[J].Journal of NANJING TECH UNIVERSITY(SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION),2017,(3):121-127.
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考虑制造商竞争的闭环供应链回收模式的决策研究()
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《南京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》[ISSN:1671-7287/CN:]

卷:
期数:
2017年第3期
页码:
121-127
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-08-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Decision Research of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Double Competition of Manufacturers
文章编号:
1671-7287(2017)03-0121-07
作者:
何晓梅1李梦2
1.安徽大学 江淮学院, 安徽 合肥 230031; 2.东南大学 经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 211189
Author(s):
HE Xiaomei1LI Meng2
1.Jianghuai College, Anhui University, Hefei 230031, China; 2.School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
关键词:
闭环供应链 制造商竞争 博弈论 回收模式
Keywords:
close-loop supply chain manufacturers of competition game theory recycling model
分类号:
F252
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
以博弈论为研究方法,建立了由两个竞争型制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商1自己负责回收,制造商2分别由自己回收、委托零售商回收、委托第三方回收,求得三种情形下制造商和零售商的最优决策,最后通过算例分析各参数与决策变量之间的关系。研究结果显示:无论制造商2采取何种回收方式,两种产品的批发价格和销售价格均不变,只与消费者支付意愿相关,而回收价格与回收双方的竞争强度正相关。
Abstract:
In this paper, based on game theory as the research method, we consider the closed-loop supply chain which consists of two competitive manufacturers and a single retailer. Manufacturer No.1 is responsible for its own recycling;while for Manufacturer No.2, recycling is examined in different models: by the manufacturer itself, by retailers and by a third party. Through comparative analysis of the three models,we get the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers. The relationships between the parameters and decision variables are analyzed through numerical examples.Regardless of which mode of recycling Manufacturer No.2 takes, the whole sale price and retail price of the two products remain unchanged, only related to consumers′ willingness to pay, and the recycling prices only related to the intensity of competition.

参考文献/References:

[1]SAVASKAN R. Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(2):239-252.
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[7]聂佳佳.零售商信息分享对闭环供应链回收模式的影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(5):69-82.
[8]安彤,周海云.政府干涉下闭环供应链的回收渠道选择策略[J].工业工程, 2015, 18(3):42-47.
[9]李健,王博.需求不确定下混合回收渠道闭环供应链模型[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 17(4):296-300.
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相似文献/References:

[1]李帮义,邓羽涵,刘志.担保下闭环供应链回收模式研究[J].南京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,15(2):116.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
【收稿日期】2017-01-27
【作者简介】何晓梅(1977-),女,安徽合肥人,安徽大学江淮学院讲师,研究方向:企业管理、物流与供应链管理。
【基金项目】国家自然科学基金项目(71371003,71390333,71531004)
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-09-20