|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]吴正祥,郭婷婷.不同批发价格谈判模式与渠道权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈研究——基于营销努力视角[J].南京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,(3):109-120.
 WU Zhengxiang,GUO Tingting.A Game Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Different Wholesale Price Bargaining Modes and Channel Power Structures:Based on Marketing Effort[J].Journal of NANJING TECH UNIVERSITY(SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION),2017,(3):109-120.
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不同批发价格谈判模式与渠道权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈研究——基于营销努力视角()
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《南京工业大学学报(社会科学版)》[ISSN:1671-7287/CN:]

卷:
期数:
2017年第3期
页码:
109-120
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-08-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
A Game Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Different Wholesale Price Bargaining Modes and Channel Power Structures:Based on Marketing Effort
文章编号:
1671-7287(2017)03-0109-12
作者:
吴正祥郭婷婷
辽宁工程技术大学 营销管理学院, 辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
Author(s):
WU ZhengxiangGUO Tingting
School of Marketing Management, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, China
关键词:
双渠道供应链 批发价格谈判模式 渠道权力结构 营销努力 渠道定价
Keywords:
dual channel supply chain wholesale price bargaining mode channel power structure marketing effort channel pricing
分类号:
F713
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
考虑双渠道供应链成员在批发价格制定过程中的讨价还价问题以及在供应链中权力的差异问题,基于批发价格制定的两种谈判基准和供应链的三种渠道权力结构,构建销售价格和营销努力共同影响需求的六种博弈模型,通过博弈模型分析得到两种批发价格谈判模式和三种渠道权力结构下的最优渠道定价策略。研究发现:相比于制造商营销努力,零售商营销努力对渠道定价和利润的影响受到更多因素的制约;制造商与零售商均愿意作为跟随方发挥后动优势;当网络直销渠道市场份额较低时,制造商与零售商偏好于以对方销售价格为基准的批发价格谈判模式,当网络直销渠道市场份额较高时,二者偏好于以自身销售价格为基准的批发价格谈判模式。
Abstract:
Considering the issue of wholesale price bargaining and power difference between dual-channel supply chain members, this paper builds six game models based on two wholesale price negotiation bench marks and three channel power structures. In the model, the demand is sensitive to both marketing effort and sale price. By solving the mathematic models, the optimal pricing policies of manufacturer and retailer are obtained in the two wholesale price bargaining modes and in the three channel power structures. On this basis, we investigate the influence of marketing effort on channel pricing through the mathematical derivation and discuss the impact of marketing effort for manufacturer′s and retailer′s profits through numerical analysis. Finally, we pointed out the preference of manufacturer and retailer on wholesale price bargaining mode and channel power structure combined with the results of the profit comparison. Results show that: compared with the influence of manufacturer′s marketing effort on channel pricing and profit, the impact of retailer′ marketing effort is constrained by more factors; both the manufacturer and the retailer are willing to be followers and play late-mover advantages; the manufacturer and the retailer tend to adopt the wholesale price negotiation with other′s selling price as benchmark in case of the market share of direct online channel is low, and both of them would prefer their own sales price as benchmark in case of the market share of direct online channel is high.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
【收稿日期】2017-03-09
【作者简介】吴正祥(1989-),男,陕西商洛人,辽宁工程技术大学营销管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:营销科学、供应链管理。
【基金项目】国家自然科学基金项目(71172218);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20122121110005)
更新日期/Last Update: 2017-09-20